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FEDERALLY FUNDED INVENTIONS: WILL THE
AGENCIES EVER GO MARCHING IN?
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ABSTRACT—For over thirty years, the Bayh–Dole Act has granted
federal agencies the power to force the recipients of federal research
funding to license the resulting inventions to third parties. Despite having
this expansive power, no federal agency has ever seen fit to utilize it. This
Note explores why Bayh–Dole march-in rights have never been used, and
proposes reforms that would help ensure that, in the instances when they
are most required, the public is able to access the inventions it bankrolled.
There have been five documented march-in petitions since the Bayh–
Dole Act was passed into law. Each petition was dismissed by the funding
agency without progressing to the march-in proceeding stage. Even if one
of these petitions had made it to the proceeding stage it is unlikely that a
march-in would have occurred. The Bayh–Dole Act’s march-in rights are
designed in such a manner that makes their effective use highly unlikely.
Procedurally, they offer expansive protections for patent holders and few
safeguards for those who petition for march-in.
A few minor reforms to the system could help appropriately balance
the march-in system’s design. Potential reforms include instituting an
appeal process, mandating a duty to use “best efforts” to bring subject
inventions to the point of practical application and report on those efforts,
clarifying the meaning of Bayh–Dole’s “reasonable terms” requirement,
and instituting a requirement that subject inventions be marketed in the
United States at internationally competitive rates. In addition, a
requirement that subject inventions be licensed via public auction rather
than private negotiation would help ensure that those best suited to
commercializing inventions have the chance to secure the rights to them.
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INTRODUCTION
In late 1980, President Carter signed into law an act that gave
unprecedented powers to federal agencies,1 powers that to this day have
never been used. The Bayh–Dole Act’s passage into law allowed for
private patents on inventions arising from publicly funded research while
also giving federal funding agencies the power to “march-in” on those
patents and grant licenses to third parties.2 Yet, despite receiving this
expansive new power, no federal agency has ever utilized it. Over thirtythree years and hundreds of thousands of patents later, not once has a
funding agency seen fit to use its march-in rights. In order to explore this
unexpected phenomenon—where government agencies are granted
expansive powers that they never use—this Note examines both the design
of the Bayh–Dole Act and, for the first time, the details of all of the
petitions for march-in brought under 35 U.S.C. § 203. After showing that

1
2

Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012).
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not only have march-in rights never been used, but that no agency has even
seen fit to even commence a formal march-in proceeding, this Note argues
that this nonuse is a product of both the provisions’ design and the agency’s
hesitancy to upset the technology transfer incentive system. This Note then
details procedural and substantive reforms that would help ensure that
march-in rights are exercised in situations where they would serve the
public good.
While march-in petitions have been rare,3 they remain relevant today.
For instance, following the recent Supreme Court ruling against Myriad in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,4 Myriad has
continued with attempts to assert its remaining rights over its breast cancer
gene detection test.5 Upset at barriers to accessing the test, some have
called on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to force Myriad to license
its patented test to other labs.6 After all, the test that Myriad so zealously
protects is based partially on the product of federally funded research.7
However, even as the calls to march in on Myriad’s patents were
raised, informed observers could be almost certain that they would not be
heeded.8 If past performance is any predictor of future behavior, the NIH
will likely deny the march-in petitions and refuse to march in on Myriad’s
gene testing patents.
It is perplexing that, over the course of over three decades, federal
agencies have accumulated march-in rights on hundreds of thousands of
patents, yet no federal agency has utilized this extraordinary power. This
Note argues that Bayh–Dole march-in rights have not been used because
the march-in procedure mandated in the Code of Federal Regulations
grants agencies wide discretion and leaves those who would benefit from
marching-in unrepresented during the proceeding and without recourse to

3 Since the 1980 signing of the Bayh–Dole Act, there have been five documented march-in
petitions—one in 1997, two in 2004, one in 2010, and one in 2012. See infra Part II.
4 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
5 See Andrew Pollack, 2 Competitors Sued by Genetics Company for Patent Infringement, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2013, at B3 [hereinafter Pollack, Competitors Sued by Genetics Company].
6 See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Francis S. Collins,
Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/07-1213-pjl-to-nih-re_-myriad-march-in [http://perma.cc/JWK7-2X8R].
7 See E. Richard Gold & Julie Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm,
12 GENETICS MED. S39, S41 (2010). The NIH contributed $5 million in grants to researchers at the
University of Utah, which subsequently licensed the technology to Myriad. Id.
8 See, e.g., Meredith Wadman, NIH Asked to Grant Open License on HIV Drug, NATURE NEWS
BLOG (Nov. 2, 2012, 22:05 BST), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/11/nih-asked-to-grant-openlicense-on-hiv-drug.html [http://perma.cc/AMX8-GBNC] (“[T]he petitioners will have some
convincing to do: in the 32 years that [the] Bayh–Dole Act has been law, the NIH has been asked to
exercise march-in rights four times. It has declined all four requests.”).
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any appeal process. These procedural issues combine with a lack of
information about Bayh–Dole subject inventions, the statutory language,
and a largely conservative approach to march-in rights by federal agencies,
to make it extremely unlikely that agencies will utilize their march-in
rights.
Understanding why march-in rights have never been used first
requires understanding their unique design and the process by which they
are exercised. The march-in process grants federal agencies wide discretion
and provides little oversight to ensure it is not abused.9 At any point in the
march-in petition process the funding agency overseeing the matter may
decline to exercise its march-in rights.10 When march-in rights are not
exercised, those who could have benefited from a forced license are left
unrepresented and vulnerable.
Along with understanding the wide discretion that march-in procedure
grants to agencies, appreciating why march-in rights are not used also
requires considering the interested groups affected by federal march-in
rights. Important players include federal funding agencies, recipients of
federal funding, patent licensees, would-be licensees, and the public.
Notably, while all of these interest groups have a stake in whether or not
march-in rights are used, they are not all present at a march-in proceeding,
nor are their interests equally protected by march-in procedure. The federal
funding agency plays a gatekeeper role with great discretion as to whether
or not march-in rights are used. This wide discretion leaves stakeholders—
notably members of the public—unrepresented and without recourse
should the agency decline to march in.
There have been few march-in petitions and none have led the funding
agency to even commence a march-in proceeding, let alone utilize its
march-in rights. Examining the details of these cases shows that the
regulations governing the instances in which march-in rights are permitted
have the dual effect of making it easy for an agency to justify not marching
in while simultaneously making the use of march-in rights harder to justify.
In order to adequately protect the public interest, the unbalanced structure
of these regulations needs reform.
Potential reforms to rebalance the march-in system include
empowering a central overseer for the commercialization of Bayh–Dole
subject inventions, modifying the march-in procedure to better protect the
rights of petitioners, mandating the maintenance of a user-friendly database
of patents that the government holds a march-in right to, instituting a duty
9
10

See 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b) (2014).
Id.
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of “best efforts” to commercialize Bayh–Dole subject inventions, and
requiring public auctions on licenses for Bayh–Dole subject inventions.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the background of
the Bayh–Dole Act and its inclusion of march-in rights. This background
section also examines the march-in rights enabling statute (35 U.S.C.
§ 203) and the march-in proceeding process circumscribed in 7 C.F.R.
§ 401.6. Subsequently, because understanding why march-in rights are or
are not used requires an understanding of the interest groups affected, it
also discusses the various parties implicated by federal march-in rights.
Part II then discusses previous march-in petitions and why they failed.
Next, Part III discusses why no federal agency has ever used its Bayh–Dole
march-in rights. Part IV details potential reforms that seek to both maintain
the integrity of technology transfer incentives while also ensuring that the
technology produced by publicly funded research is made available in an
efficient and equitable manner.
I.

THE BAYH–DOLE ACT—BACKGROUND

Congress designed the Bayh–Dole Act (the Act) to address concerns
about America’s lagging rate of innovation.11 While 80% of the patents
issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in 1965 went to
Americans, by the late 1970s, when the Act was drafted, that number had
decreased to 62%.12 Legislators worried that both confidence in the patent
system had declined, and that America was falling behind its foreign
competitors.13
Also during this time, more than half of domestic scientific research
was funded by the federal government.14 Legislators worried that much of
the resulting research output was not being adequately developed and
commercialized.15 Funding agencies had various patent arrangements with
research collaborators,16 but most left the funding agency with ownership of

11 126 CONG. REC. 29,897 (1980) (“Technological innovation in the United States is declining at an
alarming rate . . . .”); see also The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement
of Sen. Birch Bayh) (showing concern about the United States losing its technological preeminence).
12 126 CONG. REC. 29,897 (1980).
13 Id. (specifically citing concerns about competition from West Germany and Japan).
14 126 CONG. REC. 29,898 (1980); William H. Reynolds, Reforming Patent Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1980, at A23.
15 Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 2 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that “less than 4
percent” of the government’s patent portfolio is ever licensed); 126 CONG. REC. 29,896 (1980)
(statement of Rep. McClory) (“The funding agency is rarely in a position to develop these inventions.”).
16 In 1979 there were over twenty different arrangements governing ownership of inventions
arising from federally funded research. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 2.
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any patentable rights “even if the Federal Government ha[d] provided only
a small percentage of the total money involved.”17
Legislators hoped that providing patent rights to private firms would
encourage greater commercialization of inventions developed with the
assistance of federal funding.18 The Act’s supporters knew that providing
private rights for publicly funded research output might be seen as a wealth
transfer to the private sector.19 However, they hoped that the improved rate
of development and commercialization these private rights offered would
generate a net social benefit.20 The hope was that, although the public may
be temporarily deprived of access to some inventions it had funded, more
inventions would be fully developed and brought to market and thus the
public would be better off than they would have been with free access to
otherwise undeveloped federally funded inventions.
Congress anticipated that patent rights for firms would not only
improve the commercialization rates of government funded research, but it
also hoped that the new collaboration paradigm would encourage even
more research and development agreements.21 Offering the possibility of
patent rights made federal research funding more attractive economically
because firms were more likely to be able to profit from any resulting
research output, and so Congress expected more firms to apply for federal
research funding. Legislators also hoped that the Act would address small
firm hesitancy to engage in federally funded research and development
(R&D).22 Prior to the Bayh–Dole Act, these firms hesitated to use federal
research funding because it complicated the ownership of much of their
intellectual property. Previous arrangements not only did not offer firms the
potential for patent rights, but accepting federally funded R&D contracts
potentially endangered background rights to the firms’ previously patented
inventions.23
A. March-in Rights Before the Bayh–Dole Act
March-in rights were not a novel development of the Bayh–Dole Act.
In earlier iterations of patent policy, proposals to privatize the product of
17

126 CONG. REC. 29,896 (1980).
Senator Dole justified the Act by arguing that, without patent protection, firms would be
reluctant to engage in the development process because they would not be able to protect potential
earnings that the costly development process might lead to. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 28.
19 126 CONG. REC. 29,898 (1980).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 29,896.
22 Id.
23 Id. This was because many agencies had policies requiring firms sign away rights to related
patents as a condition of receiving federal research funding. Id.
18
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federally funded research were often accompanied by march-in rights
provisions.24
As early as 1945, Vannevar Bush’s25 postwar report to the President
on scientific research policy proposed patent reforms similar to those that
would eventually come to be included in the Bayh–Dole Act.26 This
proposal would have allowed recipients of federal research funds to patent
resulting inventions, with the provision that the government could assign
those rights to protect the “public interest.”27
The 1947 Attorney General’s Report on Patent Practices and Policies
inverted Bush’s proposals by advocating a default that would entitle the
government to invention rights.28 Under this proposed policy, agency heads
would be empowered to make emergency exemptions to the default policy
and allow contractors to patent resulting inventions.29 However, these
exceptions would allow the government to march in on the resulting patents
if the rights owner did not adequately commercialize the invention within a
designated period.30
Presidential memos in the 1960s and 1970s also advocated for marchin rights when agencies choose to allow private ownership of publicly
funded research output.31 The Kennedy memo of 1963 noted that agencies
had developed a variety of policies regarding rights to inventions
developed with federal funding and advocated for more uniformity.32
Kennedy’s policy required that any contractor retaining more than a
nonexclusive license in federally funded research would be required to
bring the invention to the point of practical application.33 Should the
contractor fail to take effective steps to practice the invention within three

24 See John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing – A New Twist For March-in
Rights Under The Bayh–Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 149, 151–52
(2005).
25 Bush had been head of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development during World
War II and was influential in developing postwar innovation policy. See generally G. PASCAL
ZACHARY, ENDLESS FRONTIER: VANNEVAR BUSH, ENGINEER OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1997).
26 See VANNEVAR BUSH, U.S. OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH & DEV., SCIENCE: THE ENDLESS
FRONTIER (1945).
27 Id. at 31–32.
28 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICES:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT 4–5 (1947).
29 Id. at 5.
30 Id.
31 See Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 24, at 151–52.
32 Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Oct. 10, 1963).
33 Id.
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years, the government would retain the right to force it to license the patent
on reasonable terms.34
Unlike the Kennedy memo, the Nixon memo of 1971 advocated for a
more flexible approach that would allow individual agencies to design their
own patent policies.35 The Nixon policy retained similar government rights,
granting the funding agency the ability to require the rights owner to grant
nonexclusive licenses if it had not taken effective steps towards practical
application within a three-year period.36
It was in the context of this flexible agency-by-agency approach to
technology transfer that President Carter signed the Bayh–Dole Act into
law on December 12, 1980.37 In doing so he cited the nation’s economic
health as a motivating concern for the reforms.38 Initially, the Bayh–Dole
Act—or the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act as it was
known at the time—focused on the funding agreements between federal
agencies and universities, nonprofits, and small businesses. Earlier efforts
to pass similar reforms that included patent protections for larger
corporations had faced overwhelming resistance, and so Senators Bayh and
Dole offered the more narrowly tailored act in 1979.39 However, only three
years after the Bayh–Dole Act came into effect, President Reagan
expanded its scope via presidential memorandum to treat all federal
research fund recipients the same, regardless of whether they were small
businesses, universities, or large corporations.40
B. The Bayh–Dole Act’s March-in Rights
The Bayh–Dole Act’s march-in rights provisions are detailed in
35 U.S.C. § 203. They allow the funding agency to force the contractor or
licensee to grant a license to “a responsible applicant or applicants.”41
These forced licenses can run the gamut from nonexclusive to exclusive,
potentially precluding the contractor or licensee’s own rights to use the

34
35
36
37
38
39

Id.
Government Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 23, 1971).
Id. at 16,890.
Patent and Trademark System Reform, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2803 (Dec. 12, 1980).
Id.
See Bradley Graham, Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1979,

at M1.
40
41

See Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983).
35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012).
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invention.42 If the rights owner refuses to grant the license, the agency may
grant a license itself.43
This forced licensing ability is the core power of the march-in rights
provision and is available in four instances. The first instance arises if the
rights owner “has not taken, or is not expected to take . . . effective steps to
achieve practical application” of the invention.44 This echoes the
requirements in both the Kennedy and the Nixon memos, 45 and reflects
longstanding concerns that the product of federally funded research might
linger undeveloped and unused. Second, forced licensing is also available if
the agency deems it is necessary to “alleviate health or safety needs which
are not reasonably satisfied” by the invention’s current owner or licensee.46
The third and fourth instances in which march-in rights may be used
are relatively specific compared to the first two. The third allows for forced
licenses if “action is necessary to meet requirements for public use
specified by Federal regulations.”47 The final instance allowing forced
licenses arises if the contractor or licensee does not comply with the § 204
requirement that the product of federally funded research be manufactured
domestically.48
While 35 U.S.C. § 203 spells out the rules as to when an agency may
march in on a contractor’s patent rights, the process for doing so is
described in 37 C.F.R. § 401.6.49 However, the Code of Federal
Regulations leaves march-in proceedings largely to the discretion of
individual agencies. The first stage of the process requires agencies to
notify the rights-holding contractor if it “receives information that it
believes might warrant the exercise of march-in rights.”50 The regulations
do not clarify what sort of information might warrant the exercise of
march-in rights, but past experience suggests that petitions from would-be
licensees or even the public might qualify.51 The contractor has a thirty-day
42

Id.
Id.
44 Id. § 203(a)(1).
45 See supra Part I.A.
46 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
47 Id. § 203(a)(3). This method of march-in allows for public use march-in justifications to be
specifically defined in federal regulations. Id.
48 Id. § 203(a)(4). Section 204 stipulates that licenses to Bayh–Dole subject inventions must require
that “any products embodying the subject invention . . . be manufactured substantially in the United
States.” Id. § 204.
49 These regulations are promulgated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a subagency of the Department of Commerce. See Redelegations of Authority Resulting From the America
COMPETES Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 4764 (Jan. 23, 2013).
50 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b) (2014).
51 See infra Part II.
43
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right of response after agency notification.52 After the contractor’s
response, or after thirty days in the absence of a response, the agency then
has discretion to initiate a march-in proceeding.53
Formal march-in proceedings begin with a written notice from the
agency to the contractor and its assignee or licensee as appropriate.54 This
notice must state the reasons for the proposed march-in and the field in
which it is considering requiring a license.55 After the notice, the rights
holder has thirty days in which to submit its opposition.56 If the agency
head or the agency head’s designee57 determines that this opposition raises
a genuine dispute over material facts, the proceeding will then move to a
fact-finding stage.58 This leaves a single individual with complete
discretion over whether or not the agency should continue with a march-in
proceeding.
If the proceeding reaches the fact-finding stage, fact-finding is to be
“conducted in accordance with the procedures established by the agency.”59
The Code of Federal Regulations requires that these procedures allow for
the assistance of counsel, the submission of evidence, and the presentation
and confrontation of relevant witnesses.60 Portions of the proceeding that
include evidence about the rights holder’s utilization or attempted
utilization of the invention are closed to the public.61
After the facts have been established and submitted to the agency head
or designee adjudicating the march-in proceeding, the rights holder has
thirty days to submit written arguments or make requests for oral
argument.62 The adjudicator will then take into account the facts found,
information and arguments submitted by the contractor and agency
representatives, and other information on the administrative record.63 The
agency head or designated adjudicator has ninety days to provide written

52

37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b).
Id. Note the discretion at this stage of the process. Even if a contractor does not respond to a
march-in petition, an agency may decline to initiate a march-in proceeding, and indeed no march-in
petition has ever made it past this stage of the process. Id.
54 Id. § 401.6(c).
55 Id.
56 Id. § 401.6(d).
57 The C.F.R. does not describe who may or may not be a designee. Presumably this too is left to
the agency’s discretion.
58 Id. § 401.6(d).
59 Id. § 401.6(e).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. § 401.6(f).
63 Id. § 401.6(g).
53
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notice of whether march-in rights will be exercised.64 If the agency does
decide to march-in, which has never happened, the rights holder may
appeal the decision to the Court of Federal Claims, which has the power to
affirm, reverse, remand, or modify the agency’s decision.65
Parties advocating for an exercise of march-in rights are not officially
represented at the proceeding, nor do they have any right of appeal.
Furthermore, at any time during the process the agency may terminate the
march-in proceeding “if it is satisfied that it does not wish to exercise its
march-in rights.”66
The design of these march-in rules and procedures offer some insight
into why no agency has ever marched in on a Bayh–Dole subject patent.
Simply put, the process is stacked against the petitioners. Agencies have
almost complete discretion to rule as they prefer, while petitioners are
neither represented at the hearings, nor are they able to appeal the
outcomes. When agencies consider the various interests at play, these rules
and procedures make marching in an unlikely outcome. The contractor has
a distinct procedural advantage when compared to the other parties
implicated by march-in rights.
C. Parties Implicated by March-in Rights
Understanding why march-in rights have never been used requires a
discussion of the various parties with interests in inventions that are the
subject of march-in petitions. March-in rights implicate federal funding
agencies, recipients of federal research funds, parties that license patents
arising from federally funded research, parties that wish to use patented
inventions arising from federally funded research, and the public. These
parties have different and often conflicting interests in who controls
federally funded inventions.
1. Funding Agencies.—Federal agencies are concerned about marchin rights not only because they are the primary recipients of march-in
petitions and initially decide whether or not they will be granted, but also
because the outcome of march-in petitions may have follow-on effects for
the research environment more generally. This situation presents agencies
with a balancing dilemma: they must balance the potential good that might
come from allowing greater access to a patented invention against the

64
65
66

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(j).
37 C.F.R. § 401.6(h).
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potential harm that such access by fiat might cause to the incentive system
for research, development, and commercialization.67
If the individuals charged with assessing the merits of march-in
applications had perfect information and were able to accurately balance
this tradeoff so as to maximize the public good, this balancing dilemma
would not present an issue. In reality, bureaucrats have access to imperfect
information and much of their analysis depends upon conjecture or
assumptions. In discussing why a Bayh–Dole march-in petition has never
been granted we must note that the ideal of perfectly rational bureaucratic
decisionmaking does not reflect reality.68 Institutional actors are better
understood as bounded-rational actors, subject to imperfect information,
limited resources, and emotional attachments that lead to satisficing
approaches to decisionmaking.69
2. Recipients of Federal Research Funding.—Federal research funds
go to five types of organizations: universities, industry, the federal
government (i.e., in-house research), nonprofits, and federally funded
research and development centers.70 The march-in rights issue is most
relevant to the nongovernmental entities such as universities, industry, and
nonprofit research institutions.71
These nongovernmental recipients of federal research funding have a
number of organizational interests related to the federal government’s
retained march-in rights. They have an interest in maintaining the
continued flow of research dollars. They also have an interest in ensuring
the continued value—whether it be by licensing or selfcommercialization—of the intellectual property that arises from federally

67

The concern here is that if a march-in proceeding leads to a forced license, contractors will be
less likely to pursue federally funded research in the future because of the uncertain intellectual
property rights they would have over any resulting inventions. For a discussion on the importance of
property rights in incentivizing investments in intellectual property, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 717–36 (2001).
68 See Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public
Administration and Public Policy, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 395 (2003); Herbert A. Simon,
Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 125 (1991).
69 Satisficing occurs when individuals choose a course of action not because it is the best, but
because it suffices or satisfies the demands made of them. See 14 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 504
(2d ed. 1989) (“To decide on and pursue a course of action that will satisfy the minimum requirements
necessary to achieve a particular goal.”).
70 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2927, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
18 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/82xx/doc8221/06-18research.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5XV-YUWE].
71 This is because the government generally retains ownership of the product from federal research
centers and thus does not need march-in rights over these inventions. See 37 C.F.R. § 501.6 (2014)
(“The Government shall obtain . . . the entire right, title and interest in and to any invention made by
any Government employee . . . .”).
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funded research. In addition, some recipients may also have a missionoriented or ideologically-inspired interest in promoting the spread and
utilization of knowledge.
It is important to note that funding recipients’ primary interest—
ensuring the continued flow of research dollars—leaves them with little
bargaining power during a march-in petition. Regardless of whether the
funding agency chooses to march in, academic institutions and, to a lesser
extent, industry partners, are likely to keep lining up for research dollars.
For many of these institutions there are few alternative funding sources,
and none that would fulfill the role the government plays in funding basic
research.72
3. Licensees.—Entities that license the product of federally funded
research include startups, established businesses, and patent monetization
firms. There is no shortage of firms licensing technology that might
implicate Bayh–Dole march-in rights. In 2012, universities alone executed
over 5000 licenses on their patents.73 While the licensees that use these
patents may have diverse business interests, their interests in the patents
that they license unite them as general opponents to the application of any
march-in rights petition. The current status quo, where the use of march-in
rights is unprecedented, suits the interests of those whose licensed
inventions would be at greater risk of competition should the government
change its tune.
4. Would-be Licensees.—Would-be licensees have interests
diametrically opposed to those of established licensees. These entities wish
to utilize the product of federally funded research despite existing license
arrangements that prevent them from doing so. Historic examples include
CellPro, a firm that petitioned the NIH to march in on patents owned by
Johns Hopkins University and licensed to Baxter Healthcare.74 More
recently firms like Ambry Genetics that have been sued by Myriad—the
owner of a breast cancer susceptibility screening test produced using
federally funded research—for infringement stand to benefit if the
government were to exercise its march-in rights.75
72 See JOHN F. SARGENT JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42410, FEDERAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING: FY2013 (2013).
73 ASS’N. OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS
(2012), available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FY2012_Licensing_Activity_
Survey&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11435 [http://perma.cc/4MZW-8JFJ]. While
the 5130 licenses reported by the AUTM do not all necessarily implicate Bayh–Dole Act rights, the
majority of university research is funded from federal sources and does so. See id.
74 See infra Part II.A.
75 See Pollack, Competitors Sued by Genetics Company, supra note 5.
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These entities hope the Bayh–Dole Act’s march-in provisions will
help them either avoid infringement suits that their current behavior may be
susceptible to, or allow them to expand their operations into an area
currently occupied by an entity using a Bayh–Dole subject invention. As
discussed below, the absence of would-be licensees can doom a march-in
petition if it is brought by a public interest group.76
5. The Public.—When it comes to march-in rights, the general public
has perhaps the most complex set of interests to balance. Balancing these
interests is further complicated by the public’s lack of information
regarding what patents are potentially at issue, who the interested parties
are, and how the approval of march-in petitions might affect technology
availability now and in the future.
In theory, the public’s interest is aligned with funding agencies’
interests. That is to say, each wishes to maximize both innovation and
access to technology. The public and the government, in the form of its
funding agencies, see limited monopolies over patented technologies as a
compromise used to provide incentive for innovation at the short-term
expense of access.77 However, the theory of aligned interests between the
public and its representatives does not perfectly reflect reality. In reality,
agencies, as institutional actors, have independent interests. Furthermore,
the bureaucrats that run funding agencies have their own careers to
consider both in public service and potentially in subsequent transfer to the
private sector.
In addition, the public is not a unitary actor. There are distinct groups
that may benefit more than others from the use of march-in rights on any
given technology. For instance, in the case of Fabrazyme, those individuals
suffering from the relatively rare Fabry’s disease stood to gain from a
proposed march-in on Genzyme’s license, while the interest of the public at
large may have been better served by not marching in and potentially
interfering with drug commercialization incentives.78
This difference in interests between the public and its representatives
is a potential breakdown point in the effectiveness of the Bayh–Dole
march-in provisions. Because the public has both limited information and

76

See infra Part II.B–C.
For more on the general theory of intellectual property law and incentives, see Stanley M. Besen
& Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3 (1991).
78 See Andrew Pollack, Patients Want Patent Broken on Genzyme Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2010, 4:37 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/02/patients-want-patent-broken-ongenzyme-drug/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/5LYY-8XHE] [hereinafter Pollack, Patients Want Patent
Broken]; infra Part II.D.
77
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limited access to the march-in process, the results of any given march-in
petition may not adequately represent the public’s best interest.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the lack of information about
the potential patents at issue may result in march-in petitions not even
being initiated when they might otherwise be justified.
The difficulties in balancing the interests in march-in rights share
similarities with challenges faced in patent law more generally. It is hard to
know when it would be best to march in because it is unclear what result
marching in would have on the technology transfer system. Ultimately it is
difficult to know how to most efficiently allocate rights to both maximize
innovation and access to it. In fact, these challenges are likely one of the
reasons march-in rights were included in the Bayh–Dole Act.
D. Why Include March-in Rights?
March-in rights were included in the Bayh–Dole Act both to placate
potential criticism about the government shifting wealth to firms licensing
the product of federally funded research, and to provide the government
with a policy tool it could use to try and ensure adequate commercialization
and protect the public interest.
At the time of drafting the Bayh–Dole Act, Congress was aware that
granting private ownership to the product of publicly funded research ran
the risk of appearing as a wealth transfer to private interests.79 Retaining
march-in rights over these inventions was a way for the government to
nuance this property transfer, making it less offensive to potential critics.
Earlier drafts of the Act included even more protections against this
perceived wealth transfer. The “Return of Government Investment” section
would have required entities profiting from products that embodied Bayh–
Dole subject inventions to share a portion of those profits with the
government.80 This provision would have ensured that the government
recouped much of the cost of subsidized research when that research led to
commercialized products. Ultimately, however, the Bayh–Dole Act relied
on march-in rights as the chief protection of the public’s interest in
federally funded research.

79 See 126 CONG. REC. 29,898 (1980) (statement of Rep. Brown) (“I am aware of the concern that
granting contractors exclusive rights to federally funded inventions is a ‘give-away’ of the taxpayers’
property.”); 126 CONG. REC. 8738 (1980) (statement of Sen. Long) (“It is dismaying, therefore to find
that S. 414 provides for contractors . . . to receive gifts of ownership of taxpayer-financed research, and
according to S. 414’s chief sponsor, this is to be only a first step.”).
80 S. 414, 96th Cong. § 204 (1980); see also 126 CONG. REC. 8739 (1980) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(“The Government payback provision guarantees that the Government’s investment, paid for by the
taxpayers of this country, is returned to the Federal coffer.”).
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Instead of granting outright unencumbered title to the resulting
inventions, march-in rights enabled agencies to maintain the public’s right
to access the inventions it funded. Their inclusion was framed as a way to
“diffuse the danger of monopolies.”81 It is unclear whether Bayh–Dole’s
drafters envisioned that the provisions would ever be used, or, if their
inclusion was more strategic in nature, intended to preemptively counter
allegations of wealth transfer. Regardless, as is detailed below, the design
of the Act makes it highly unlikely that they will be effectively used as they
are currently implemented.
In addition to serving as a response to potential criticisms about
public-to-private wealth transfer, march-in rights help ensure patented
inventions are used and thus serve a functional role in supplementing the
Bayh–Dole Act’s incentive structure.82 One of the Bayh–Dole Act’s
objectives was to create a technology transfer system that brought to
market inventions that had previously remained underdeveloped because
no firm was willing to invest in them without a guarantee of exclusivity.83
The drafters hoped that these patents would provide incentives to help spur
innovation.84 However, by granting patents on these inventions, the Act
also risked allowing private parties to withhold the inventions from their
competitors and the public. March-in rights address this concern by
retaining the right to force licenses, should the patenting entity or its
licensee not use the invention.
March-in provisions provide a tool to protect the public’s interest by
enforcing practical application of Bayh–Dole subject patents. As such, they
can be thought of as a method to allow for public input in an intellectual
property regime that rarely invites public involvement. Other elements of
the patent system at times privilege the patent holders’ interests above
competing interests. For instance, the establishment of a specialized patent
appeal court in the Federal Circuit is thought by many to have strengthened
patent rights and led to more findings of infringement than would otherwise

81

126 CONG. REC. 8739 (1980) (statement of Sen. Dole).
Much of the rhetoric used to justify the Bayh–Dole Act accentuated the fact that many products
of federally funded research were never commercialized. See 125 CONG. REC. 2407 (1979) (statement
of Sen. Bayh) (“Of the 30,000 patents that the Government presently holds, less than 4 percent are ever
successfully licensed.”); Dear Colleague Letter from Sen. Birch Bayh et al. (Feb. 7, 1979) (stating that
“[t]he bill addresses a serious and growing problem: hundreds of valuable . . . discoveries are sitting
unused under government control”) (on file with author).
83 See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
84 See Birch Bayh, Remarkable Benefits, Remarkable Breakthroughs, TECHCOMM, Apr.–May
2005, at 12, 29 (“The Bayh–Dole Act was designed to inject the incentive of the free market into what
had become a slumbering U.S. patent system.”).
82
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have occurred.85 This specialized court with potential pro-patent leanings
privileges inventors over the general public. Similarly, the USPTO
provides few opportunities to include the public in its deliberations, and
some even suggest that it treats patent applicants as clients and is thus more
responsive to their needs than the needs of the public.86
This role as a potential entry point for the public voice in matters
concerning access to technology is an especially important element of the
Bayh–Dole technology transfer system both because of pro-patent
tendencies in other areas of the patent system, and because it is part of the
bargain that the public strikes with inventors who accept public research
funding. Regardless of whether the principle motivation for including
march-in rights was to make the Act less offensive to opponents, or
whether the drafters intended march-in rights to be used to protect the
public interest and encourage commercialization, very few attempts have
actually been made to use the provisions.
II. PREVIOUS MARCH-IN ATTEMPTS
Apart from the current Myriad case, there have been five documented
petitions for federal agencies to march in on Bayh–Dole subject inventions.
All of these petitions were aimed at the NIH and are detailed below. 87 Each
of these denials shows the NIH’s hesitancy to use march-in provisions. We
also see a body of march-in precedent building up over time as the NIH has
begun to cite denials of previous march-in petitions to support subsequent
denials. In order to demonstrate how the Bayh–Dole march-in provisions
have played out in application, the sections below will discuss each of these
previous march-in attempts.
A. John Hopkins University v. CellPro
CellPro’s march-in petition arose following a legal dispute with Johns
Hopkins University over patented inventions that Johns Hopkins had

85

Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent Litigation: The Apparent Influence of
Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 581 (1994).
86 Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965,
1984–88 (2009).
87 That the NIH has been the sole recipient of march-in provisions is likely a product of its very
large research budget—and thus oversight over a very large number of Bayh–Dole subject inventions—
and the fact that the technologies it oversees are often important both economically and to individuals’
health and wellbeing.
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developed with funding assistance from the National Institutes of Health.88
The patents related to technologies used to identify and separate bone
marrow stem cells from other cells.89 CellPro had developed and brought to
market two devices used to purify stem cells that Johns Hopkins claimed
infringed on its patents.90
After losing the infringement suit, CellPro submitted a petition to the
NIH, supported by Senator Bayh, requesting that the NIH use its march-in
rights to grant licenses that would allow CellPro to continue selling its cell
purification devices.91 In its petition, CellPro argued that Hopkins’s
licensee Becton Dickinson (Becton) and Becton’s sub-licensee Baxter
Healthcare (Baxter) were not sufficiently practicing the invention, having
not even applied for FDA pre-market approval until thirteen years after
filing their patent application.92 Meanwhile, CellPro had brought a device
to market and attained FDA approval for its use.93 This first line of
reasoning used to justify its march-in petition relied on the Bayh–Dole
Act’s § 203(a)(1) “practical application” requirement.94 CellPro also argued
that the march-in should be allowed for public health reasons,95 relying on
the Act’s § 203(a)(2) “public health” march-in allowance.96
Harold Varmus, the Director of the NIH at the time, ultimately
rejected CellPro’s petition.97 He reasoned that the practical application
argument failed because Baxter had achieved regulatory approval in
Europe for its stem cell purification device and was in the process of
seeking the same in the United States. Varmus held that Hopkins’s
vigorous protection of its patents and Baxter’s pursuit of an active FDA
approval application were sufficient to fulfill the Bayh–Dole Act’s
requirement that patent holders and assignees take “effective steps to
achieve practical application” of the technology in question.98

88 See Determination in the Case of Petition of CellPro, Inc., Harold Varmus, Nat’l Insts. of Health,
Office of the Dir. 1 (Aug. 1 1997), available at http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro/pdfs
/foia_cellpro39.pdf [http://perma.cc/YBJ7-BNNL] [hereinafter CellPro Determination].
89 See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 931 F. Supp. 303, 312 (D. Del. 1996).
90 Id.
91 Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh–Dole Act and the Hopkins v. CellPro
March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211, 223 (2000).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2012).
95 Valoir, supra note 91, at 223.
96 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
97 CellPro Determination, supra note 88, at 1.
98 § 203(a)(1); CellPro Determination, supra note 88, at 5.
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Similarly, Varmus rejected CellPro’s health or safety need argument.99
He held that the district court order allowing CellPro’s interim production
of its devices until alternative devices attained FDA approval was sufficient
to protect public health and safety.100
B. Norvir
In 2004, members of the public and Congress petitioned the NIH to
march in on Abbott Laboratories’ ritonavir (trade name Norvir) patent.101
The petition arose after Abbott increased the price of Norvir by more than
500%.102 Petitioners advanced various theories as to why Abbott’s price
increases justified a statutory march-in,103 with one of the dominant theories
being that Abbott’s pricing violated the Bayh–Dole Act requirement that
inventions be brought to market under reasonable terms.104
Finding that none of the explicit statutory justifications for march-in
were present in this case, the NIH rejected the petition and opted not to
commence a march-in proceeding.105 The NIH claimed that Bayh–Dole
march-in proceedings were an inappropriate remedy for drug pricing
disputes, preferring instead that the Federal Trade Commission pursue the
issue as a possible violation of antitrust law.106
In 2012 NGOs again petitioned the NIH to march-in on the Norvir
patent.107 This second petition relied on similar justifications as those used
99

See CellPro Determination, supra note 88, at 6.
See id. at 1. This order required CellPro to make royalty payments to Baxter. Id. at 7.
101 Determination in the Case of Norvir, Elias A. Zerhouni, Nat’l Insts. of Health, Office of the Dir.
3–4 (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-InNorvir.pdf [http://perma.cc/MK5T-7RF8] [hereinafter Norvir Determination I].
102 See David Brown, Group Says U.S. Should Claim AIDS Drug Patents, WASH. POST, May 26,
2004, at A04.
103 Norvir Determination I, supra note 101, at 3.
104 Brown, supra note 102; see also Petition to use Authority Under Bayh–Dole Act to Promote
Access to Ritonavir from Essential Inventions, Inc. 9 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/norvir/norvir-29jan04petition.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7BDTKM5K] (arguing that “reasonable terms” include reasonable prices). The requirement that inventions be
brought to market under reasonable terms is found in the definitions section of the Bayh–Dole Act in its
explication of the meaning of “practical application.” 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2012); see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 401.2(e).
105 Norvir Determination I, supra note 101, at 4–6.
106 Id. at 6.
107 See Request for March-in on Abbott Patents for Ritonavir from Am. Med. Students Ass’n et al.
(Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/2012_Oct25_Ritionavir_march_in_
complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/NTM3-9TY2] [hereinafter Ritonavir Petition from AMSA et al.]. This
second petition was brought by four NGOs: the American Medical Students Association, Knowledge
Ecology International, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and the Universities Allied for Essential
Medicine. James Love, Four NGOs Ask NIH to Grant Open Licenses to Ritonavir Patents under BayhDole March-in Provisions, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 25, 2013, 10:39),
http://keionline.org/node/1573 [http://perma.cc/95PE-B4MM].
100
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in the first. Petitioners raised the international price differences as their
chief concern and proposed two rules to govern patented inventions that
benefited from federal funding. The first proposed rule would have tied
American drug pricing to prices in other high-income countries.108 The
second rule proposed mandatory licensing of patented inventions that
benefited from federal funding, provided the use was medical in nature.109
Unsurprisingly, relying on much the same reasoning as in its 2004
determination, the NIH rejected this second petition.110 Because Abbvie
(Abbott’s pharmaceutical spin-off) was able to show widespread
availability and use around the world, the NIH found it had achieved the
practical application requirement.111 The NIH also found no risk to health
and safety and thus rejected a § 203(a)(2) march-in.112
The petitioners also raised a § 203(a)(3) march-in argument113 by
arguing that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Patient
Protection and Care Act (PPACA) required that the NIH march in.114 The
NIH rejected this line of reasoning, arguing that this march-in avenue is
available “when a statute or regulation . . . specifically requires the use of a
patented technology.”115 Because neither the ADA nor the PPACA
specifically require the use of Norvir, the NIH determined that march-in
would be inappropriate.116
In ruling not to begin a march-in proceeding on Norvir, the NIH also
rejected petitioners’ two rule proposals.117 The director of the NIH, Francis
S. Collins, seems to suggest that the NIH’s statutory authority requires
case-by-case analysis to determine whether any of the four Bayh–Dole
march-in criteria are met.118 Pronouncing rules like those proposed by the

108

Ritonavir Petition from AMSA et al., supra note 107, at 16–17.
Id. at 18.
110 See Determination in the Case of Norvir, Francis S. Collins, Nat’l Insts. of Health, Office of the
Dir. 2, 4–6 (Nov. 1, 2013), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
policy/March-In-Norvir2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/HK52-FRVJ] [hereinafter Norvir Determination II].
111 Id. at 4.
112 Id. at 4–5.
113 This section allows for march-in “to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal
regulations.” 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012).
114 See Norvir Determination II, supra note 110, at 5. Petitioners argued that the pricing was
prejudicial against those with HIV and thus contravened the ADA’s prohibition of discrimination
against those with disabilities, and that the high price for Norvir was tantamount to a preexisting
condition limitation in violation of the PPACA. Ritonavir Petition from AMSA et al., supra note 107, at
14.
115 Norvir Determination II, supra note 110, at 5.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 6.
118 Id.
109
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petitioners would extend march-in power beyond that allotted by the Bayh–
Dole Act.
C. Xalatan
The latanoprost (trade name Xalatan) case shares many similarities
with the first Norvir petition. Both petitions were made by Essential
Inventions, a Washington-based nonprofit organization.119 Pfizer marketed
Xalatan to treat Glaucoma but charged different prices across markets.120
The petitioners argued that Pfizer’s American pricing for Xalatan was
excessive, as evidenced by lower pricing in Canada and Europe.121
In its response to the Xalatan march-in petition, the NIH argued that
the case did not fall under any of the § 203 march-in categories.122 When
assessing the § 203(a)(1) “practical application” requirement, the NIH drew
on the precedent it had established in the CellPro and Norvir cases. The
Director argued that, as in the previous cases, manufacturing the product
and making it available to the public is sufficient to fulfill the practical
application requirement.123
When assessing the possibility of a § 203(a)(2) health and safety
march-in, the NIH argued that petitioners had brought forth no evidence to
suggest that marching in would alleviate any health or safety concerns.124
The fact that Xalatan was a widely prescribed FDA-approved drug seemed
to weigh in its favor.125
As in the case of Norvir, the NIH again argued that pricing was not an
appropriate justification for a Bayh–Dole march-in.126 Expressing concern
about the potential implications for the “market dynamics” of products

119 Lisa Richwine, US Firm Seeks License for Pfizer, Abbott Drugs, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2004,
available at Factiva, Doc. No. LBA0000020040128e01s0084w; see also Petition to Use Authority
under Bayh–Dole Act to Promote Access to Latanoprost from Essential Inventions Inc. (Jan. 29, 2004),
available
at
http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/xalatan/xalatan-29jan04petition.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9CFC-DBYZ].
120 Richwine, supra note 119.
121 Determination in the Case of Xalatan, Elias A. Zerhouni, Nat’l Insts. of Health, Office of Dir. 1
(Sep. 17, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-inxalatan.pdf [http://perma.cc/YSR2-BQUB] [hereinafter Xalatan Determination].
122 Id. at 4–6.
123 Id. at 4–5.
124 Id. at 5.
125 Id. In addition to dismissing the practical application and public health and safety justifications
for march-in, the NIH avoided discussing the other two prongs of the march-in analysis (the Federal
Regulations stipulation and domestic manufacture requirements) based on similarity with the Norvir
Determination I, supra note 101, where they were held to be “clearly not relevant.” Xalatan
Determination, supra note 121, at 5 nn.5–6.
126 Xalatan Determination, supra note 121, at 6.
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developed under licenses subject to the Bayh–Dole Act, the NIH opted
instead to leave the issue of drug pricing to Congress.127
D. Fabrazyme
In 2010 three individuals with Fabry’s disease petitioned the NIH to
march in on Genzyme’s patent for Fabrazyme, the only approved treatment
for the disease.128 The petitioners grounded their plea for a march-in
proceeding in § 203(a)(2), arguing that forced licensing was “necessary to
alleviate health or safety needs.”129
NIH-funded research at Mount Sinai School of Medicine had led to
the development of Fabrazyme. Mount Sinai subsequently sold an
exclusive license for the related patents to Genzyme.130 Genzyme’s
monopoly on Fabrazyme production resulted in shortages when its plant
became contaminated with a virus and had to be shut down for
decontamination.131 This shortage in turn led to treatment rationing for
those suffering from Fabry’s disease.132 In order to remedy the drug
shortage, the Fabry disease sufferers petitioned for a march-in that they
hoped would lead to an open license on the Fabrazyme patents and
payment of a “reasonable royalty” to Genzyme.133
As in the four previous petitions, the NIH declined to commence a
march-in proceeding.134 Based on the information available at the time, the
NIH reasoned that granting a march-in on the Fabrazyme patents would not
alleviate the drug shortage because no competitors were at the time
expecting “imminent FDA approval of a competing version.”135 Even if it
had granted licenses, any Fabrazyme competitors would have had to go
through the lengthy FDA approval process.136 Genzyme was scheduled to

127

Id.
See Petition to Use the Bayh–Dole Act to Promote Access to Fabrazyme from C. Allen Black,
Jr. (Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/fabrazyme_petition_2aug2010.doc
[http://perma.cc/8JA9-MGTM] [hereinafter Fabrazyme Petition]; Pollack, Patients Want Patent Broken,
supra note 78.
129 Fabrazyme Petition, supra note 128, at 6 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)).
130 Pollack, Patients Want Patent Broken, supra note 78.
131 Victor Bethencourt, Virus Stalls Genzyme Plant, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 681, 681 (2009).
132 Pollack, Patients Want Patent Broken, supra note 78.
133 Fabrazyme Petition, supra note 128, at 12 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)).
134 Determination in the Case of Fabrazyme, Francis S. Collins, Nat’l Insts. of Health, Office of the
Dir. 1 (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/MarchIn-Fabrazyme.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SAG-S772] [hereinafter Fabrazyme Determination].
135 Id.
136 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2014).
128
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have resumed full production before any competitor could possibly have
been approved for commercialization.137
The NIH also pointed out that, despite the petition’s request to also
provide alternate manufacturers with the Fabrazyme cell line and
Genzyme’s technical know-how, the Bayh–Dole Act march-in powers only
apply to the subject inventions, not the associated “tangible materials or
unpatented technical know-how.”138
In April 2011, following the NIH’s decision not to commence marchin proceedings, the Fabry’s patients petitioned the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) asking for a rehearing of their original petition
and a rulemaking to clarify when Bayh–Dole march-ins should be
initiated.139 After Genzyme had revised their original goal of rectifying the
supply problem from the first half of 2011 to the second half, petitioners
argued that Genzyme’s predictions were unreliable and that the NIH should
thus grant patent licenses to other manufacturers.140 The petitioners also
argued that Genzyme’s redirection of some Fabrazyme stock to Europe,
where approved alternatives existed, also supported a march-in to protect
American health and safety.141
Along with their petition for a rehearing, the petitioners requested the
promulgation of new regulations to clarify march-in procedure and
encourage more third parties to petition for march-in licenses.142 The
suggestions included stricter regulations of manufacturers, forcing them to
notify the NIH of potential shortages; publicization of potential shortages
to encourage third parties to seek march-in licenses; a duty on contractors
and licensees to report on use and distribution of the invention; and a lower
bar to granting march-in licenses when there is a clear threat to human
health.143
In February 2013, the NIH again declined to commence a march-in
proceeding, and closed the file on the Fabrazyme march-in petition.144 In

137

Fabrazyme Determination, supra note 134, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
139 Petition for Rehearing and Rulemaking Regarding In the Case of Fabrazyme from C. Allen
Black, Jr. 2 (2011), available at http://www.patentlawyersite.com/files/Download/NIH%20PETITION
%20FOR%20RULEMAKING%20AND%20REHEARING%209.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5EQ2-JJZD]
[hereinafter Petition for Fabrazyme Rehearing].
140 Id. at 6.
141 Id. at 8–9.
142 Id. at 18–19.
143 Id. at 19–21.
144 Fabrazyme March-in Close-out, Mark L. Rohrbaugh, Nat’l Insts. of Health 2 (Feb. 13, 2013),
available
at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/Fabrazyme-CABlack.pdf
[http://perma.cc/342J-6L37].
138
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support of the outcome, Dr. Rohrbaugh stated that by late 2012 Genzyme
had restored full dosing to all patients, and that the NIH had received no
requests from third parties wishing to license the Fabrazyme patents.145
E. Summary of March-in Petitions
The above Sections detail each of the five past Bayh–Dole march-in
petitions.146 Every one of these petitions came to the same end, with the
NIH declining to commence a march-in proceeding. Table 1 summarizes
these previous petitions, the § 203 causes of action that they raised, and the
reasons that the NIH used to justify not commencing march-in proceedings.
TABLE 1: MARCH-IN PETITIONS & OUTCOMES
Argument for March-in

Reason for Declining

CellPro
(1997)

Practical application – § 203(a)(1)
Public health and safety – § 203(a)(2)

Application imminent;
Interim usage allowed following
patent infringement case.

Norvir
(2004)

Unreasonable pricing

Unreasonable pricing not an
enumerated march-in justification

Xalatan
(2004)

Unreasonable pricing

Unreasonable pricing not an
enumerated march-in justification

Norvir II
(2012)

Unreasonable pricing

Unreasonable pricing not an
enumerated march-in justification

Fabrazyme
(2010)

Public health and safety – § 203(a)(2)

March-in deemed incapable of
timely alleviating drug shortage

III. WHY MARCHING IN IS UNPRECEDENTED
The complete lack of not only a successful march-in petition, but even
the commencement of a march-in proceeding, is due to both the rare nature
of march-in petitions and the nature of the Bayh–Dole Act and its
enforcement. There have been few opportunities for federal agencies to
exercise their march-in rights. With only five recorded petitions and
determinations, it is not surprising that a march-in has never occurred. In
addition, Bayh–Dole’s emphasis on property rights to encourage
commercialization makes agencies wary of trammeling on those rights out

145

Id. at 1.
To my knowledge, these five examples represent the entire population of Bayh–Dole march-in
petitions submitted since the Act came into effect in 1980.
146
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of fear that this might upset the technology transfer incentives that have
thus far proven successful.
A. Lack of Petitions
In the over thirty years since the Bayh–Dole Act went into effect,
there have been only six notable march-in petitions targeting only five
separate inventions.147 There are two possible explanations for this
phenomenon: either the federal technology transfer system works so well
that all useful inventions are used and more march-in petitions would be
inappropriate or no one is submitting petitions in instances where marchins would be appropriate.
Given that federal funding agencies have had march-in rights over
hundreds of thousands of inventions, it is difficult to believe that none but
the five noted above were viable march-in targets. For this to be the case it
would require every other invention that has arisen from federally funded
research to have been fully used to the extent of its utility and the demand
for it in the marketplace. It is highly unlikely that this has been the case.
This strongly suggests that there are possible march-in target inventions
that no one is petitioning for.
There are three nonexclusive explanations for the lack of petitions on
inventions that might merit one: potential petitioners may be unaware of
the inventions or the government’s march-in right (an information gap);
alternately, it could be that there is insufficient market demand for the
inventions and thus no incentive to petition for a march-in (insufficient
demand); finally, it is possible that, even in cases with sufficient
information and demand, the low chance of success discourages parties
from investing in march-in petitions (perceived futility). From a technology
transfer policy perspective, the information gap and perceived futility
explanations raise concerns that merit special consideration, while the
insufficient demand explanation mirrors a challenge common to patent law
more generally.
The information gap explanation would suggest that there are
potentially useful inventions that, but for some party’s ignorance of either
the existence of the invention or the government’s march-in rights over it,

147 These are the five listed supra Part II and the recent Myriad petition. To the best of my
knowledge these six are the totality of serious petitions received by federal funding agencies. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-742, INFORMATION ON THE GOVERNMENT’S RIGHT TO
ASSERT OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER FEDERALLY FUNDED INVENTIONS 9 (2009) available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09742.pdf [http://perma.cc/A2AX-PSW7] [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(explaining that the DOD, DOE, and NASA have never received march-in petitions, while, as of 2009,
the NIH had received only three).
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would otherwise be commercialized.148 Similarly, the perceived futility
explanation suggests that there may be inventions that would attract marchin petitions and potentially justify a march-in were it not for the current
pro-property-right design of the technology transfer system. On the other
hand, the insufficient demand explanation raises no concerns that are
peculiar to technology transfer law. The challenges faced in developing
low-demand inventions are well-known and would not be best dealt with
by technology transfer statutes.
Some argue that the lack of march-in petitions is emblematic of
market forces that will naturally lead to a dearth of Bayh–Dole march-ins.
For instance, shortly after the CellPro decision, some argued that market
forces will preempt the use of march-in rights.149 This argument assumes a
perfectly functioning market in which potentially profitable inventions will
always be developed while unprofitable inventions will not attract march-in
petitions.150 That said, given the sheer number of inventions that arise from
federally funded research, there are almost certainly Bayh–Dole subject
inventions that are not commercialized in the most efficient manner.
March-in rights should be honed so that they can be used to minimize
delays in the commercialization of these sorts of inventions.
B. The Nature of the Bayh–Dole Act and its Enforcement
Along with the lack of petitions, the nature of the Bayh–Dole Act
itself and the way it is implemented by federal funding agencies offers
another explanation for why march-in proceedings are unprecedented.
1. The Act’s Intent.—Congress intended the Bayh–Dole Act to
increase the commercialization of federally funded inventions.151 This
statutory intent discourages marching in by federal funding agencies
because the specter of forced licenses would act as a disincentive to
investment in commercialization. Granting forced licenses would leave
inventors or their licensees uncertain about the degree of market exclusivity
they might enjoy and thus less likely to invest in commercializing
inventions that may ultimately be made available to their competitors.
This line of reasoning reflects the general belief in the value of strong
property rights as an integral facet of effective innovation policy.152 In some
148

See infra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., Kevin W. McCabe, Implications of the CellPro Determination on Inventions Made
with Federal Assistance: Will the Government Ever Exercise Its March-in Right? 27 PUB. CONT. L.J.
645, 649 (1997).
150 Id. at 662.
151 See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).
152 See Kieff supra note 67; GAO REPORT, supra note 147, at 8.
149
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ways, the Bayh–Dole Act represents the culmination in the postwar trend
towards greater protections for intellectual property because, while it
creates march-in rights, they are designed in a manner that makes it highly
unlikely that they will be successfully used.
2. Agency-by-Agency Interpretation and Lack of Oversight.—The
lack of a standard Bayh–Dole interpretation among funding agencies and
potential conflicts of interest at agency technology transfer offices present
another set of issues that may discourage effective march-in petitions.
While agencies rely on Department of Commerce regulations on the Bayh–
Dole Act’s implementation of march-in rules, each agency is free to
interpret the Act itself to determine whether or not it should exercise
march-in authority.153 Furthermore, there is no central body monitoring the
outcome of march-in petitions to ensure that agencies are applying the rules
in a consistent manner. Admittedly, this has been a nonissue as the NIH has
been the only agency faced with applying the rules, but it nonetheless
injects a potential point of ambiguity into the federal technology transfer
system. Possible march-in petitioners cannot be sure that other agencies
will approach the march-in issue in a manner similar to that used by the
NIH. This uncertainty makes potential petitioners less likely to invest the
time and resources necessary to pursue a petition.
3. Possible Conflicts of Interest.—The role played by agency
officials charged with assessing march-in petitions offers another potential
point of ambiguity in the march-in system. There is some concern that, at
least in the NIH’s case, these officials may have some conflict of interest in
applying the Bayh–Dole Act.154 Dr. Francis S. Collins, the director of the
NIH at the time of the Fabrazyme march-in petition, is listed as an inventor
on at least nineteen inventions to which Bayh–Dole provisions apply.155
This raises the concern that he may have some interest in the development
of the NIH’s Bayh–Dole precedent because the value of the statutory
royalties he receives may be affected should the NIH begin to grant marchin licenses. The concern here is that the NIH appears to be building a set of
march-in precedent as it relies on previous determinations to inform
petitions.156 If that precedent is informed by individuals with a pecuniary
interest in not granting march-in petitions it may end up being more antimarch-in than it otherwise might have.

153
154
155
156

GAO REPORT, supra note 147, at 7.
Petition for Fabrazyme Rehearing, supra note 139, at 17–18.
Id. at 17.
See Norvir Determination II, supra note 110.
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This raises the related issue of regulatory capture.157 The lack of
oversight over federally funded inventions leads to concerns that agencies
charged with managing public rights in Bayh–Dole subject inventions
advance the interests of researchers and patent rights holders, rather than
making decisions that advance the public interest. There are numerous
reasons to think that this concern is warranted. The fact that agencies often
have repeat relationships with funding recipients suggests they may be
more likely to reach decisions favorable to those parties so as to maintain
good relations. Similarly, the “revolving door” problem of agency
employees pursuing subsequent careers in the private sectors they were
once charged with regulating is a potential concern for federal technology
transfer managers.158
4. Procedural Design Stacked Against Petitioners.—The march-in
procedure’s design is another factor that discourages successful march-in
petitions. The procedure, as detailed in 37 C.F.R. § 401.6, gives complete
discretion to funding agencies over the process and allows no appeal right
to petitioners. The degree of discretion enjoyed by funding agencies starts
petitioners off from a point of great uncertainty. Initially, the funding
agency in question has complete discretion as to whether or not it will even
commence a march-in proceeding159—indeed we saw above that all
petitions thus far have resulted in the NIH using this discretion to opt not to
commence a proceeding. Furthermore, even if an agency does commence a
proceeding, it can terminate the proceeding at any point if it decides it does
not wish to exercise its march-in rights.160 The scope of this complete
discretion may discourage possible petitioners from submitting march-in
petitions because there is little to ensure that their petition will be granted a
thorough review on the merits.
The fact that petitioners have no right of appeal compounds this
complete agency discretion. Should a proceeding commence and the
agency come to a decision “unfavorable to the contractor” (i.e., should the
agency opt to exercise its march-in rights), the decision will be held in
abeyance for sixty days, giving the patent rights holder an opportunity to
file an appeal with the United States Court of Federal Claims.161 Petitioners
have no such right. If and when agencies decline to exercise their march-in
157 See generally Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. OF ECON.
POL’Y 203 (2006); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making:
A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. OF ECON. 1089 (1991).
158 For a discussion of the “revolving door” phenomenon, see Dal Bó, supra note 157, at 214–15.
159 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b) (2014).
160 Id. § 401.6(h).
161 35 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(j).
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rights there is no right to an appeal. This bias towards protecting
intellectual property rights reflects the general tenor of the Bayh–Dole Act,
but the result is that potential petitioners may be discouraged from
investing in petitioning for a march-in when the procedure so clearly favors
the patent holders.
The reasons discussed above—information gaps, perceived futility of
petitioning, lack of standard Bayh–Dole precedent, potential conflicts of
interest, and a procedural design stacked against petitioners—all combine
to make the effective use of march-in rights highly unlikely. This is a
concern because march-in rights provide one of the key tools to protect the
public’s interest in accessing inventions that it bankrolled. In order to
ensure that march-in rights can effectively serve this function, some
reforms are needed.
IV. REFORMS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The final section of this Note proposes a variety of procedural and
substantive reforms that will help ensure that the Bayh–Dole march-in
provisions effectively protect the public interest in publicly funded
inventions. Procedural reforms include shifting the balance of the march-in
proceeding to better represent the interests of the petitioner and public as
well as establishing central oversight of federal agencies’ application of
Bayh–Dole transfer. Substantive reforms suggested include a more
stringent interpretation of the Act’s “practical application” requirement and
instituting an open bidding process for Bayh–Dole subject invention
licenses.
A. Procedural Reforms
Instituting an appeal process for petitioners and further centralizing
the execution of Bayh–Dole are both attainable procedural reforms that
would help ensure the public interest is protected by the Bayh–Dole marchin provisions.
The march-in procedure is currently slanted in favor of funding
recipients at the expense of those who would have federal agencies march
in on Bayh–Dole subject inventions.162 At the least, this imbalance could be
corrected by granting petitioners an appeal right equal to that granted to
contractors in 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(j). This would ensure that, if a march-in
proceeding ensues and the petition is subsequently denied, the petitioners
would be entitled to an appeal to ensure that the correct conclusion was
reached.
162

See supra Part III.
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To further balance the procedure, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) could provide a centralized second-look service
when agencies decline to commence march-in proceedings after they are
petitioned to do so. This would help ensure that there is a check on the
currently unchecked discretion that agencies enjoy in deciding whether or
not to commence a march-in proceeding. The NIST is already tasked with
maintaining the march-in procedure regulations.163 Having the NIST also
monitor march-in petitions and ensure that agency determinations are not
abuses of agency discretion would help protect the public interest in
publicly-funded inventions.
The NIST could serve other functions as a centralized regulator of the
march-in process. In addition to serving as a check on agency discretion,
the NIST could maintain a centralized database of Bayh–Dole subject
inventions. This would help alleviate the information gap that may
contribute to the lack of march-in petitions.164 Such a database would
document all of the inventions that federal agencies have march-in rights
over. Providing this sort of centralized record of all Bayh–Dole subject
inventions would allow the public to better monitor its investment in
research and development to ensure that these inventions are appropriately
developed and utilized.
The NIST could also more closely monitor problematic inventions to
ensure that their commercialization is proceeding in an acceptable manner.
More active monitoring would provide further incentive for effective
commercialization. Under the status quo, any signs of commercialization,
or intent to commercialize in the future, can be interpreted as sufficient to
withstand a § 203(a)(1) practical application march-in petition. Closer
monitoring of especially important inventions or inventions that petitioners
have indicated as problematic in their commercialization would act as a
signal to the contractor or licensee encouraging them to commercialize or
risk losing their exclusivity over the invention.
This monitoring could take the form of scheduled reports from those
who license Bayh–Dole subject inventions.165 If licensees have a duty to

163 See Redelegations of Authority Resulting From the America COMPETES Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
4764 (Jan. 23, 2013).
164 See supra Part III.A.
165 This is not an entirely novel suggestion. In fact, early after the Bayh–Dole Act was
implemented, at least one agency wished to see plans for the “development and marketing” of products
before agreeing to extend licenses on Bayh–Dole subject inventions. See Letter from Donald Ian
MacDonald, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Health, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Alan R. Bennett
(June 3, 1986) (on file with author). However, the bill’s drafters opposed this policy and the 1984
amendments were intended “to make it a matter of routine for contractors to grant exclusive licenses to
licensees” for the life of the patent without requiring any showing of intent to commercialize. Letter
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report their progress on commercializing subject inventions to the NIST, it
will allow not only for NIST oversight to ensure that patents are not being
licensed and shelved for strategic reasons, but it could also provide more
information to help close the information gap described above. If these
reports were public, groups interested in certain inventions and competitors
who may benefit from a march-in would be able to use the
commercialization reports to monitor inventions of interest and perhaps
inform march-in petitions.
Some might argue that a duty to report on the progress of
commercializing Bayh–Dole subject inventions adds an unnecessary
administrative burden to the process of dealing with federal funding
agencies. While it is true that it would somewhat increase administrative
costs for the patent rights holders, it is also true that they are the recipients
of very large sums of public money and if adding a duty to report
commercialization progress will help ensure that the public’s resources are
well-used, then a minor administrative burden is tolerable.
B. Substantive Reforms
Along with the procedural reforms proposed above, the substance of
Bayh–Dole march-in law could be changed to ensure that the public’s
interest remains protected. By recasting “practical application” to more
stringently police commercialization, and by mandating auctions for
licenses on Bayh–Dole subject inventions, Congress could improve the
efficiency of the federal technology transfer system.
The Bayh–Dole Act’s practical application requirement requires that
subject inventions are made “available to the public on reasonable
terms.”166 Petitioners raised this argument as justification for march-in in
the Norvir and Xalatan cases.167 Each time petitioners raised this argument,
the NIH responded by suggesting that the FTC or Congress would be better
suited to regulate drug pricing.168 Congress could do so by clarifying the

from Sen. Bob Dole to Otis M. Brown, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Apr. 8, 1986) (on file
with author).
166 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2012).
167 Ritonavir Petition from AMSA et al., supra note 107, at 9; Petition to use Authority Under
Bayh–Dole Act to Promote Access to Ritonavir from Essential Inventions, Inc. 9 (Jan. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/norvir/norvir-29jan04petition.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PU2C-ZBAS]; Petition to Use Authority Under Bayh–Dole Act to Promote Access to Latanoprost from
Essential Inventions, Inc. 6 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/
xalatan/xalatan-29jan04petition.pdf [http://perma.cc/VQW5-UTXN].
168 See Norvir Determination I, supra note 101, at 5–6; Xalatan Determination, supra note 121,
at 6.
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meaning of the “reasonable terms” that Bayh–Dole subject inventions must
be brought to market under.
The Bayh–Dole Act attempts to balance the commercialization of
federally funded inventions with the right of the people to access the fruits
of publicly funded research. When the fruits of that research are available
to citizens of foreign nations—who have not subsidized the cost of the
research—for much lower prices, it suggests that the balance has not been
adequately struck. To correct this imbalance, Congress could amend the
Bayh–Dole Act to mandate a most-favored-nation status requiring that
subject inventions be brought to market in the U.S. on terms at least as
amendable as the terms in similarly economically developed countries.
Petitioners in the second Norvir march-in petition argued for a similar rule
that would bar U.S. prices from exceeding the prices in seven peer
countries, or exceeding the median peer country price by more than 10%.169
Adoption of a most-favored-nation pricing rule for Bayh–Dole subject
inventions would help discourage profiteering off of public research. As
discussed above, in their current state, march-in rights are an ineffective
price regulation tool. The result is that when contractors or their licensees
have an invention with few close substitutes, they may engage in monopoly
pricing. In the case of Norvir, when researchers discovered that the dosage
could be reduced and the drug combined with other protease inhibitors,
Abbott increased Norvir’s price by over 500%.170 Despite the fact that the
federal government provided Abbott with $3.5 million in research funding
that helped lead to Norvir’s invention,171 the federal technology transfer
policy as it is currently implemented does nothing to regulate this sort of
pricing behavior.
Beyond the drug-pricing concern, Congress could also clarify the
practical application requirement in a manner that would set minimum
standards for commercialization efforts. The five unsuccessful march-in
petitions detailed above suggest that the NIH uses a relatively forgiving
interpretation of practical application. It seems likely that if a licensee can
show any efforts at development, regardless of their efficacy, the NIH is
hesitant to march in because it fears upsetting the incentives for licensees to
license and develop inventions.
Congress could increase incentives to commercialize effectively by
requiring that licensees use “best efforts” to bring inventions to the point of
practical application. Instead of allowing those holding rights in Bayh–

169
170
171
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Dole subject inventions to meet the practical application bar by showing
any activities aimed at using the invention, a best efforts standard would
require rights holders to be diligent in their efforts to bring the invention to
the point of practical application.172 This heightened standard would leave
licensees at risk of a march-in if they were to neglect the Bayh–Dole
subject inventions that they license. Given the importance of effective
commercialization that underpins the Bayh–Dole Act, this increased focus
on efforts to develop licensed inventions is commensurate with the Act
more generally and with the public’s interest in ensuring efficient use of
public research funding.
In addition to altering its treatment of the practical application
requirement, Congress could further encourage commercialization by
establishing rules that help ensure the best candidate licenses Bayh–Dole
subject inventions. This could be done by requiring public auctions for
licenses on Bayh–Dole subject inventions. Under the current system,
licenses can be granted in any manner the rights owner desires. There is no
assurance that patents are shopped to various licensees, or even shopped at
all. While one might expect rational recipients of federal funding to
diligently seek out the most lucrative licenses possible, there is evidence to
suggest that this often does not occur.173 A mandatory auction system with
publicity requirements would help ensure that all parties interested in
commercializing an invention get the opportunity to license it.
CONCLUSION
The Bayh–Dole Act attempts to balance incentives to commercialize
with access to federally funded research. The march-in provisions are
meant to provide assurance that inventions arising from federally funded
research are adequately commercialized. However, the march-in process is
currently designed in such a manner that it will almost certainly never be
effectively used.
As currently designed, march-in procedure is unbalanced. It protects
the rights of patent holders much more thoroughly than it protects the
public’s right to access federally funded inventions. Agency discretion is
unchecked, and there is little oversight to ensure that the march-in process

172 See E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984) (“Best efforts is a standard that has diligence as its
essence and is imposed only on those contracting parties that have undertaken such performance.”).
173 See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational
Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1521 (2012) (arguing that “licensing
markets for university inventions are strikingly ‘thin’ and that personal relationships between industry
and university personnel—including faculty inventors—are critical”).
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is effectively managed. In addition, there is a dearth of information about
which inventions are subject to the Bayh–Dole Act, leaving the public
uncertain about when march-in rights are even an option.
A few minor reforms to the system could help ensure that march-in
petitions are given the attention they deserve and that federally funded
research is commercialized on reasonable terms. Potential reforms include
instituting an appeal process that would allow petitioners to appeal agency
decisions not to march in on Bayh–Dole subject inventions, mandating a
duty to use “best efforts” to bring subject inventions to the point of
practical application and to report on those efforts. In addition, Congress
should clarify the meaning of Bayh–Dole’s “reasonable terms”
requirement, and consider instituting a requirement that subject inventions
be marketed in the United States at internationally competitive rates.
Finally, a requirement that subject inventions be licensed via public auction
rather than private negotiation would help ensure that those best suited to
commercializing inventions have the chance at securing the rights to them.
These reforms would help ensure that the effective federal technology
transfer system implemented by the Bayh–Dole Act remains a robust
contributor to American innovation for the foreseeable future.
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